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A system of agents moving along a road in both directions is studied numerically within a cellular-
automata formulation. An agent steps to the right with probability q or to the left with 1− q when
encountering other agents. Our model is restricted to two agent types, traffic-rule abiders (q = 1)
and traffic-rule ignorers (q = 1/2). The traffic flow, resulting from the interaction between these
two types of agents, is obtained as a function of density and relative fraction. The risk for jamming
at a fixed density, when starting from a disordered situation, is smaller when every agent abides by
a traffic rule than when all agents ignore the rule. Nevertheless, the absolute minimum occurs when
a small fraction of ignorers are present within a majority of abiders. The characteristic features for
the spatial structure of the flow pattern are obtained and discussed.
PACS numbers: 89.40.–a,45.70.Vn,87.23.Ge,02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Society has various rules to regulate interactions
among its members. While some of these rules might
be enforced by authorities and turned into laws, quite a
few have evolved over a long time and have turned into
conventions. Just as in natural sciences, rules or con-
ventions, regulating the interaction between individual
constituents, often result in emerging global patterns. A
traffic rule which enforces individual vehicles/pedestrians
to move along only one side of a road clearly results
in a global traffic flow pattern (see, e.g., Ref. [1]). Be-
cause of this connection, traffic problems have often been
studied by using methods and concepts from nonequi-
librium statistical physics (for a review, see Refs. [2]
and [3]). The approaches from physics include hydro-
dynamic descriptions [4], differential equations describ-
ing effective microscopic forces [5], and cellular automata
(CA) [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. In particular, the CA approach
is often used in broad contexts of agent-based modeling
as an efficient way of accounting for complicated inter-
actions among constituents. Due to the computational
efficiency, CA is particularly suitable for analyzing the
dynamics of many individuals who try to move in differ-
ent directions while at the same time being influenced by
the motions of other individuals. It is notable that the
jamming in vehicular traffics has natures different from
that in pedestrian traffics. The former is explained by
the time delay in the responses of the drivers, and this is
the reason why the jamming may easily occur with ve-
hicles only in one direction [10]. In the latter case, on
the other hand, the jamming is caused by the collision
of agents in opposite directions [7]. This study is mainly
∗Corresponding author, E-mail: beomjun@skku.edu
focused on this pedestrian case.
In the present work, we use the CA approach and find
that the minimal risk for a jamming of the pedestrian
flow occurs when a small fraction of traffic-rule ignorers
is present within a majority of traffic-rule abiders. Even
though this result is obtained within our simplified model
system, it raises an interesting question on the observ-
ability and implication of such a phenomenon in social
systems. Here we provide a detailed description on this
observation as well as a qualitative understanding.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we re-
view the basics of a coordination game based on a traffic
rule. We describe how we have performed our numer-
ical experiments in Sec. III. The results are presented
and compared to the coordination game in Sec. IV. The
results are summarized in Sec. V.
II. COORDINATION GAME
Let us first consider two players moving on a road in
opposite directions heading for a direct collision. Each
of them can choose to step aside left (L) or right (R) in
order to avoid the collision and it is avoided only if both
make the same choice. Thus the options both L or both R
are equally gainful, whereas the choices LR and RL lead
to collision. The situation is summarized in Table I in
the form of a doubly-symmetric two-person coordination
game [11, 12]. Each player will behave according to a
strategy in the form of a complete description of which
action is taken under every possible circumstance. In
what follows, we denote the strategy of an agent as Sq
if she chooses R with probability q (and thus L with
probability 1−q). For example, if a player always chooses
R (L), her strategy is represented as S1 (S0).
The concept of equilibrium is useful in analyzing a
game: suppose that everyone has chosen a strategy so
2TABLE I: Normal form of a traffic-rule coordination game.
Since the situation is symmetric to each player, only one
player’s payoff is presented in this table after normalized to
unity. Both players are better off when they choose the same
moves (left/left and right/right).
Left Right
Left 1 0
Right 0 1
that no one gains anything by changing her strategy uni-
laterally, such a set of strategies constitute a Nash equi-
librium [12]. In the case of the coordination game, there
exist three strategies which are Nash equilibria, i.e., S1,
S0, and S1/2. The pure strategies S1 and S0 simply rep-
resent the ordinary traffic rules such that agents should
always step aside to the right or always to the left. Due
to the left-right symmetry in the problem both S1 and
S0 compose Nash equilibria. On the other hand, if one
makes a decision at random by tossing a coin, then obvi-
ously the opposing player cannot gain anything no matter
what strategy she changes to. Consequently, the mixed
strategy S1/2 also constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
We next consider the evolutionary stabilities [13] of
these Nash equilibria in a population where every pair
of members plays the game. Suppose that almost all the
players adopt a certain strategy S. The strategy S is
called evolutionarily stable when another mutant strat-
egy S˜ cannot invade the population of S since the payoff
of S˜ is less than that of S. Mathematically, the evolution-
ary stability of the mixed strategy Sq is equivalent to the
stability of a population where a fraction Q = q of mem-
bers have S1 while the others have S0 [13]. Note that
such equivalence holds only when there exist two pure
strategies. In the stability analysis, one often employs a
dynamics resulting as individuals in a group try to adopt
the strategies of more successful individuals. Such a situ-
ation can be modeled as follows: the relative proportion
QS of players who use strategy S is assumed to grow
in time in proportion to the payoff WS at the last time
step. This particular dynamics is given by the replicator
dynamics equations [13],
Q˙S ≡
dQS
dt
= QS
(
WS −
∑
S′
WS′QS′
)
within the continuum time approximation, where the last
term has been inserted to make the constraint
∑
S QS =
1 fulfilled at any time t. In our traffic-rule game, we have
QS0 +QS1 = 1, and therefore we may set QS1 ≡ Q and
QS0 ≡ 1−Q to study the evolutionary stability of Sq with
q = Q. From Table I, it follows that the expected pay-off
for an agent is given by the probability of encountering
a traffic-rule abider or ignorer, respectively, resulting in
WS1 = Q and WS0 = 1 − Q. For example, if Q = 1/4,
an agent with strategy S1 will have a chance out of four
to meet another with the same strategy, meaning that
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FIG. 1: Movements of a self-propelled agent. The solid arrow
indicates the agent’s intrinsic direction, while the dotted ones
indicate its possible evasions when the intrinsic direction is
blocked by another agent.
her expected payoff amounts to 1/4 at every encounter.
Consequently, the replicator dynamics equations can be
cast in the form
Q˙ = Q{Q− [Q2 + (1−Q)2]}
= Q(1−Q)(2Q− 1).
From the stationarity condition Q˙ = 0 we find three Nash
equilibria at Q1 = 0, Q2 = 1, and Q3 = 1/2, which in
turn correspond to q = 0, 1, and 1/2, respectively. The
linear perturbation ǫn introduced to the nth Nash equi-
librium by Q = Qn + ǫn (n = 1, 2, 3) satisfies ǫ˙1/ǫ1 < 0,
ǫ˙2/ǫ2 < 0, and ǫ˙3/ǫ3 > 0, respectively, and we find that
only the last equilibrium point Q = 1/2 is unstable in
this dynamics. In other words, a convention of randomly
choosing left or right is unlikely to emerge, since people
eventually learn that the traffic improves if a majority
settles for one of the alternatives. Note that this con-
clusion is based on the assumption of full mixing, cor-
responding to the mean-field approximation in physics.
To what extent is the simple picture, implied by Table I,
also valid for a two-dimensional plane filled with moving
agents? This question is investigated in the following.
III. NUMERICAL SETUP
A. Moving code
We start with a simple self-propelled agent, derived
from Ref. [8], which obeys the following moving code
(compare to Fig. 1). It has its own intrinsic direction,
either upward or downward. It can move only to a neigh-
boring cell at each time step, and a single cell cannot al-
low more than one agent at the same time. If the agent’s
front cell is empty, it moves to the cell with the probabil-
ity 1− s, where s denotes the probability of spontaneous
stopping. If the agent is prevented from moving forward,
because the front cell is already occupied, then it steps
aside to the right with a probability q or to the left with
1 − q. In case it attempts to the right (left) but cannot
because there is already an agent in that cell, then it pro-
ceeds to try the alternative option left (right). In case
this is also prevented, it just remains in its present cell.
3At least two steady states can be found within this mov-
ing code: one is the complete jamming where no one can
move forward and the other one is a perfectly collision-
less flow where every column is occupied only by agents
moving in the same direction.
B. Initialization
A road is a two-dimensional plane, which has a size of
X × Y in units of cells. We impose a periodic boundary
(PB) in the y direction to make the road homogeneous
in that direction. In the x direction, on the other hand,
there are walls which prevent agents from being at x ≤ 0
or x > X . At the initial time, the agents are randomly
distributed with a density ρ on the road, and their intrin-
sic directions are given upward or downward with equal
probability. Such a starting condition is qualitatively
similar to a walking street filled with mingled pedestri-
ans which all start to walk home at the same moment.
The number of agents is N = ρXY , and the numbers of
upward and downward agents are N/2. Among these N
agents, pN agents have q = 1 so that they always try
the right-hand side first, while the others have no pref-
erences, i.e., q = 1/2. There are no initial correlations
among the position, intrinsic direction, and preference.
C. Recursive update
All agents make moves in accordance with the moving
code in a random sequential order (RSO). A simultane-
ous update is, in practice, not possible since each update
then involves finding all consistent possibilities based on
all individual possibilities of all the agents. The RSO
update together with the PB condition causes an arti-
fact called deadlock. Imagine that one column is fully
occupied by players having the same intrinsic direction
with zero stopping probability (s = 0). Even though all
of them want to move in the same direction, they can-
not within the RSO update since no one finds an empty
space in front of herself. Therefore, RSO needs to be
modified as follows. Suppose that an agent A is picked
up by RSO to be updated. Then we regard A’s current
position as empty and search for a new position for it
according to the moving code. If agent A is blocked from
going forward by another agent B, which has the same
intrinsic direction as A but not updated yet at this time
step, we do not exclude the possibility for both of them
to move together simultaneously, so we let B move first.
If B is also in the same situation by a third agent C, this
procedure is repeated recursively. When this recursion
goes all the way around PB to A’s position again, the
column of agents will be updated by one cell forward al-
together. One time step is completed when the moving
code is applied to all the N agents.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Transition between two steady states,
the complete jamming and the collisionless flow, as density
ρ changes. Both of the fraction p of rule abiders and the
stopping probability s are set to zero and the road is given
as 50 × 200. Depicted here are the flow φ and the time τ
to either of the steady states after being averaged over 103
samples under a cutoff of tc = 10
6.
IV. RESULTS
A crucial question, when it comes to traffic flow, is
under what conditions the traffic will jam. This usually
happens when the traffic gets too dense. Hence, one may
expect that there exists a critical traffic density ρ = ρc
beyond which the propensity for jamming becomes high.
In our traffic model we measure the traffic flow φ, the
fraction of agents advancing in its intrinsic direction, at
a given density of agents ρ and average over a large num-
ber of random initializations. Figure 2 shows one exam-
ple, together with the average time τ taken to reach a
steady situation, which is either a jam or a steady-state
flow. Close to ρc the time to reach a steady situation be-
comes so large that we, for practical reasons, introduce a
large time cut-off tc in the simulations. As illustrated in
Fig. 2, there is a sharp cross over from a low- to a high-
risk jamming at around a well-defined critical density ρc.
The flow φ is averaged over 103 samples in this figure
and determined by how many samples will settle down
to the steady flow. Intuitively one would expect that ρc
decreases as we make the road larger for a fixed density
of agents and fixed width of the road; any point along the
road is a potential site where a jamming could start and
grow into a road block across the road which implies that
the longer the road the larger the risk for jamming (see,
for comparison, Ref. [6]). In Fig. 3 it is shown that this is
also true in the case where the width and the length in-
crease simultaneously, preserving the geometrical shape
of the road. Since ρc decreases as the size of the road in-
creases (even when the geometrical shape is preserved),
we speculate that the jamming transition has the large-
size limit ρc = 0 in our model. This also implies that the
capacity of a road, measured as the amount of traffic that
a road will transmit on average before the traffic jams,
increases less than linearly with the road size.
A striking feature of Fig. 3 is that ρc does not grow
monotonically with the proportion of traffic-rule abiders
p. In other words, when only 60% of agents abide by
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Flow φ, as a function of ρ and p,
with the stopping probability s = 0. The road sizes are (a)
50×200 and (b) 100×400, respectively. Each point is obtained
from 103 random initial conditions. Completely black region
indicates that the system is in a traffic jam, one of the steady
states, while all the agents move freely when the parameters
p and ρ are within the white region corresponding to φ = 1.
103 samples. (c) Sectional plots of φ with fixing ρ in 50× 200
and (d) in 100 × 400. The nonmonotonic behavior of φ is
more pronounced in the latter case, which has enough room
for developing spatial patterns as described in the text.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Snapshots of density distributions in
the long run when only rule abiders are present (p = 1). The
average is taken over about 103 samples at t ≥ 6×104, where
X = 100, Y = 400, and ρ = 0.2. The stopping probability is
set as (a) s = 0 and (b) s = 0.01, respectively.
the rule, for example, the road of 100× 400 has a higher
capacity than when 90% abide by the rule.
One possible guess would be that the traffic reduction
with abundant rule abiders is caused by their concen-
tration on the wall sides, since it is an inefficient use of
resources if they are populated only at those parts of the
road. However, that scenario does not explain this phe-
nomenon. Let us plot the spatial density d(x) for the
groups of pedestrians so that
∑
x d(x) = 1 is satisfied for
each group. Rule abiders do not occupy only the sides of
the road if the stopping probability s is zero because then
rule abiders have no reason to move in the lateral direc-
tion once forming a lane anywhere on the road [Fig. 4(a)].
Even if s 6= 0 as in Fig. 4(b), a high density of agents does
not disturb the maximal flow velocity due to the recursive
update (Sec. III C).
In order to gain some further insight into the mutual
effect between rule abiders and rule ignorers, we have
studied the spatial flow structure in more detail. To this
end it is convenient to include a tiny nonzero stopping
probability s (we use s = 0.01 in the simulations) for
the following reason: whenever an agent stops, agents
colliding from behind try to step aside as prescribed by
the moving code. Hence a nonzero stopping probability
generates small diffusive processes in the lateral direc-
tion. This helps the system to arrive at a robust spatial
steady state without changing the numerical results in
any essential way.
For simplicity we choose the case when the rule ignor-
ers are restricted to move upward (Fig. 5). According
to the moving code, agents moving in opposite directions
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Snapshots of density distributions with
the condition that rule ignorers move only upward. The av-
erage is taken over 103 samples, where X = 100, Y = 400,
ρ = 0.2, p = 0.9, and s = 0.01. (a) t = 102, (b) t = 2 × 103,
(c) t = 4× 103, and (d) t = 6× 103.
will have a stronger interaction than agents moving in the
same direction. Since rule abiders always prefer the right-
hand side, the most rapid process is the pushing of the
downward rule abiders to the left side of the plot in order
to avoid agents moving upward [Fig. 5(b)]. By symmetry
the upward rule abiders get pushed out of the left region
preferred by the downward rule abiders. However, rule
ignorers have no preference between left and right, and as
a consequence they remain for a longer time in the mid-
dle region. Their presence further pushes the downward
rule abiders to the left wall. Note that the upward rule
y=1 y=400
x=100
x=1
FIG. 6: (Color online) A typical distribution of agents taken
from a sample at t = 103 with ρ = 0.2, p = 1.0, and s = 0.01,
where the road is given as 100× 400. Two intrinsic directions
are marked with different colors so that red (dark) dots mean
upward rule abiders and green (bright) dots mean downward
rule abiders.
abiders, on the other hand, have little interaction with
rule ignorers since all of them are basically headed for
the same direction. As these upward rule abiders move
very slowly in the x direction, many of the rule ignorers
cannot penetrate into the right side, i.e., x > 50, but re-
main on the wrong side of the road with respect to the
traffic rule [Fig. 5(d)].
Also in the case which includes downward rule ignorers
in addition, rule abiders are more quickly evacuated from
the central part of the road in the presence of rule ignor-
ers. In addition, rule ignorers play an important role in
smoothing out uneven agent concentrations on the road.
These uneven concentrations arise because the upward
rule abiders have an average drift toward the right side
of Fig. 5, when starting from a random initial condition,
while downward rule abiders drift in the opposite direc-
tion. As a consequence they interact and usually form
long narrow trains in the central part of the road (Fig. 6).
This leads to high local concentrations on the road from
which jamming can start and develop. However, with a
sufficient number of rule ignorers, these trains are broken
into a more evenly distributed concentration, reducing
the risk of jamming.
Snapshots of the flow development for the case includ-
ing downward rule ignorers as well as upward rule ignor-
ers are shown in Fig. 7. One notable point is that the
rule ignorers tend to make a backflow against the rule
abiders. One sees abundance of upward rule ignorers on
the left-hand side of the median line at x = X/2 and
conversely abundance of downward rule ignorers on the
right-hand side of the median line [Fig. 7(d)]. The up-
ward (downward) backflow is developed by rule ignorers
who are repelled by downward (upward) movers gather-
ing densely beside the left (right) wall. This is a numer-
ically stable pattern which is rather unexpected from an
intuitive point of view.
Finally, we have tested how much the result changes
with a variation in the moving code. The traffic rule
becomes softened so that it acts only to rule abiders on
the wrong side of the road. If standing on the right side,
even rule abiders will be just the same as rule ignorers.
This rule was designed to check whether the excessive
concentration on the wall sides, as in Fig. 4(b), could be
relaxed without altering the qualitative results. Numeri-
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Snapshots of density distributions,
when both of upward and downward rule ignorers are present.
The average is taken over 103 samples, where X = 100,
Y = 400, ρ = 0.2, p = 0.9, and s = 0.01. (a) t = 102,
(b) t = 3× 103, (c) t = 104, and (d) t = 3× 104.
cal simulations show that the nonmonotonic behavior of
ρ still remains and the optimal p is even lowered than
before [Fig. 8(a)]. A closer look indicates that jamming
is likely to develop around the median line x = X/2,
since the momentum of rule abiders to the right side dis-
appears while crossing the line, leading to congestion at
that point [Fig. 8(b)].
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FIG. 8: (Color online) (a) Flow φ, as a function of ρ and p,
when the traffic rule is applied only to rule abiders on the
wrong side of the road. In accordance to Fig. 3, we take
averages over 103 samples with a size of 100 × 400 and set
s = 0. (b) A snapshot of the spatial distribution for ρ = 0.1
and p = 0.9, taken at t = 6× 104. This shape maintains itself
with time for s = 0, while for a nonzero s, the peaks on the
middle are slowly relaxed outward.
V. SUMMARY
In our numerical simulation based on the CA approach,
we have observed that the jamming transition density on
two-dimensional planes does not monotonically increase
with the fraction of rule abiders. It implies that a cer-
tain amount of rule ignorers may diminish the propensity
for jamming by diminishing the risk for high local traf-
fic concentrations. In contrast to the coordination game,
which presumes two rational players acting to maximize
the gain by either abiding to or breaking the traffic rule,
the situation on a large road is generally more complex;
it involves interactions among agents which lead to non-
trivial flow patterns in a long time. Our result suggests
that there are situations when abiding too strictly by a
traffic rule could lead to a jamming disaster which would
be avoided if some people just ignored the traffic rule
altogether.
One should note that this is drawn by our model sys-
tem under certain conditions, which captures only a part
of the pedestrian dynamics. Our observation demon-
strates one possible complexity of the pedestrian prob-
lem that even such simple agents could lead to an unex-
pected global behavior. It also supports to some extent a
7hypothesis that the most successful behavior in social or
biological systems is achieved when both of the regular
and random factors are incorporated, which should be
further examined in future research.
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